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Are Europe’s welfare states ﬁt to meet the demands brought on by the ﬁnancial crisis? In an
interview with EUROPP’s Managing Editor Stuart Brown, Tito Boeri discusses the need for a
‘stress test’ of the European welfare state, why citizens in southern European countries have been
much more susceptible to poverty during the crisis, and the role that EU cooperation should play in
providing a more eﬀective safety net for European citizens.
You have argued that alongside bank ‘stress tests’, which aim to determine whether banks
have the capacity to deal with adverse economic developments, Europe should also carry
out something approximating a stress test of European welfare states. Has the importance of welfare states
been overlooked in Europe’s response to the crisis?
Well in the last few years we have had several stress tests of the banking system in Europe. These tests have had
the intention of assessing the vulnerability of ﬁnancial institutions to negative economic developments, such as
serious drops in GDP or changes in interest rates. But a similar analysis has not been carried out with reference to
a key pillar of the European Union: the welfare state.
The welfare state is supposed to act as a safeguard, particularly during diﬃcult times like those which have occurred
in Europe since the crisis. It essentially has three key functions. The ﬁrst function, which is perhaps its overriding
purpose, is to provide relief from poverty or to prevent a rise in poverty rates. The second function is one of
protecting against privately uninsurable labour market risks, such as providing unemployment beneﬁts in case
people lose their jobs. The third function is to promote labour force participation. In a period of economic crisis the
ﬁrst of these functions is clearly the most important.
Now during the Great Recession we haven’t seen many of the things that we saw in the Great Depression of the
1930s. It is true that for some countries the last few years have actually been even worse by some measures: the
fall in GDP in some southern European countries was larger this time around than it was in the Great Depression.
Also if you compare industrial production, which has been captured very nicely by Barry Eichengreen and Kevin
O’Rourke, you do see that in some respects things have been worse.
But for the most part we have not seen anything like the classic image that we have of the Great Depression, with
huge numbers of middle class people suddenly becoming poor. What we have seen is something diﬀerent, with the
numbers of homeless people rising, for instance. So it is very important to analyse precisely what impact welfare
states are having, which is now feasible because we have good data on aspects like incomes, consumption
patterns, and labour markets. This is the kind of ‘stress test’ of the European welfare state that I have been trying to
do in my work.
What are some of the key ﬁndings from this analysis?
The ﬁrst thing that I tried to do was calculate some basic threshold levels. For instance, how much would GDP have
to decline in a given country for poverty to start rising? Although you can talk about poverty thresholds changing
over time, I took poverty as an absolute value: I calculated the relative poverty threshold in a certain year, which is
60 per cent of the median income in a country, and froze it over time in real terms. So if someone slipped below this
threshold in future years they would be classed as being in poverty, even if the median income also changes during
this period.
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It turns out that for the European Union as a whole, a recession which results in a drop of 0.7 per cent of GDP will
signiﬁcantly increase the poverty rate. However there is a large variation between EU countries. Whereas in some
southern European countries even a milder recession will increase poverty rates, in the Nordic countries a
recession as high as 5 per cent of GDP does not result in a rise in poverty rates. This underlines that there are
substantial diﬀerences in the way in which diﬀerent countries in Europe react to these conditions.
Similar ﬁndings come from analysing the poverty rates and unemployment rates. In southern Europe it is suﬃcient
to have a rise in unemployment of around 1.3 base points for poverty to increase, while in the Nordic countries the
relation between poverty rates and unemployment is almost ﬂat: unemployment can rise signiﬁcantly without
aﬀecting poverty. So clearly there is a problem of vulnerability in certain parts of Europe which does not exist in
other countries to the same extent.
Why is this type of vulnerability more severe in southern European countries and what can be done to
address the problem?
Part of the reason is that these countries have developed institutions which make them particularly vulnerable to
economic shocks. In particular, these countries relied in the past to some extent on families providing support, which
constituted a kind of informal welfare state. They also transformed and reformed their labour markets in a partial
way. They introduced so called ‘two-tier’ systems, where there is a coexistence of workers with open-ended
contracts and those with ﬁxed-term contracts in the same labour market.
In these systems all of the risk falls on those with open-ended contracts. We saw this during the recession, where
employers clearly found it more convenient to lay oﬀ those workers who did not have a permanent contract because
it was far less costly to do so. This occurred even if the workers losing their jobs were younger or potentially more
productive. At the same time, the system is heavily imbalanced when it comes to welfare. A pure unemployment
insurance system requires a long contribution period, and given these workers typically have many short spells of
employment, they often fail to reach the level of contributions that would make them eligible for full unemployment
beneﬁts.
So these issues need to be tackled. On the one hand these countries need to address the contractual dualism which
exists and ﬁnd a way to unify the labour market. This is something which can be done independently in each
country. For example Italy recently introduced a graded security contract which is really aimed at absorbing
temporary workers into permanent jobs. This worked just by making it easier for employers to lay oﬀ workers in the
initial stage of their career, with protection gradually increasing throughout an individual’s employment.
Another reform which these countries should pursue is to make the coverage of unemployment beneﬁts wider, while
trying to build up a safety net for those who become unemployed. This would make their welfare systems more
similar to those which exist in northern European countries. But this second approach is more diﬃcult to implement
at the national level. Whereas addressing contractual dualism has no ﬁscal implications, increasing the coverage of
unemployment beneﬁts has direct ﬁscal implications and is relatively costly to achieve.
In several Eurozone countries which are undergoing ﬁscal consolidation policies this just isn’t feasible. So a related
policy conclusion that one could draw from this situation is that when you have asymmetric shocks within a
monetary union, which hit some countries more than others, the ﬁscal rules that prevent these countries from
adopting strategies to improve their welfare systems are extremely damaging.
These are policies which can be implemented at the national level, but how important is the European level
in solving the problems you have discussed?
If you look at what is happening with unemployment in Europe, it has become increasingly divided in terms of
countries rather than regions. Historically there have been very signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences within countries, for
example between the North and South of Italy, but the countries which have suﬀered during this recession have
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been damaged entirely – in strong regions as well as weaker regions, with a few exceptions. Meanwhile, the
convergence in social spending within the EU that was taking place before the crisis has been interrupted.
So one wonders whether as a result of all of these factors we need to think more about coordination in terms of
Europe’s social model. There are clearly spill-overs across jurisdictions and there is a very important issue with
poverty which should be one of our key priorities, given the founding principles of the EU. From a macro-standpoint
there are also implications because greater coordination in terms of welfare spending would provide automatic
stabilisers which are more eﬃcient than those which have been used during the recession.
How should this be done in practice? Well there are proposals to introduce an EU-wide safety net. There are also
proposals to introduce a European unemployment beneﬁt system. In light of the current policy debates in Europe
both of these proposals might seem like extremely diﬃcult objectives to reach. But perhaps something a bit less
ambitious, like an equal opportunity contract for young workers in Europe, which gives them some funding to pay for
training or to buy pension or unemployment beneﬁt rights, may be a better way to proceed. But deﬁnitely one of the
key lessons that we can draw from this stress test is that we don’t just need a welfare state in Europe, we also need
a welfare union.
Tito Boeri presented his research at a recent public lecture hosted by the LSE’s European Institute
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